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RETHINKING CUSTOMARY LAW IN 
TRIBAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher* 
Customary law still appears in many if the dedsiollS if American state and federal 
courts. Modem courts rely less on wstomary law, part and parcel of the English 
common law adopted alld adapted by the Founders if the United States, with 
statutory and administrative law dominating the field. In cOlllrast, the importance if 
customary law in American Indian tribal courts cannot be understated. Indian tribes 
now take every measure conceivable to preserve Indigenous wltures and restore lost 
wltural knowledge and practices. Tribal court litigation, espedally litigation 
involving tribal members and issues arising out if tribal law, iften tllrIlS on the 
andent customs and traditiollS if the people. But this development if applying 
customary law in tribal courts is new and IlIldertheorized. 
For the first time, this Article attempts to provide an adequate theory as to how 
tribal judges shollld find and apply customary law on a normative level. This 
Article argues that tribal judges have a great deal to learll from H.L.A. Hart's 
theory if primary and secondary rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ottawa Indians, removed from their homelands in the western Great 
Lakes region and living in Kansas in the mid-19th century, codified a se-
ries of laws and published them in the Ottawa First Book. 1 The laws appear 
to be an attempt to create a bridge between the tribal customs and tradi-
tions under which the Ottawas lived in their traditional homelands and 
their new surroundings in the Great Plains. One law, "Burning;' provides, 
"If any person shall set fire to the prairie, and burn another's property, he 
shall pay for what is burnt.,,2 Another is "Revenge," which states "If any 
person, having his property lawfully taken, shall become angry, or threaten 
to take revenge, or shall injure another's property, he shall see more trou-
ble. Whatever the lawmen shall decide on, so it shall be.,,3 According to 
commentary on the Ottawa laws, the laws of the Ottawas in 1850 were 
"primarily customary law," but were "evolving in the direction of statute 
1. See Theodore John Rivers, A Study of the Laws if the Ottawa Indians as Preserved 
in the Ottawa First Book (1850),42 KAN. HIST. Q. 225,225 (1976). 
2. ld. at 229. 
3. ld. at 228. 
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law made in the tribal council ... as distinguished from laws simply passed 
on in an oral manner from generation to generation.,,4 
What were the laws passed on in an oral manner from generation to 
generation? What remained of those customary laws5 for the Kansas Ot-
tawas in 1850 as they attempted to create a written tribal code? What 
remains of those customary laws over 150 years later? There are four fed-
erally recognized Ottawa Indian tribes in the United States as of 2006. 6 
Others are petitioning for federal recognition. There are several Ottawa 
First Nations in Canada. The four Ottawa tribes recognized by the 
American federal government, at least, each have a tribal court system. 
Does the customary law of the Ottawa Indians have any impact in those 
tribal courts? How do they go about discovering customary law? Can 
customary law be discovered with any certainty and validity? Is customary 
law useful in modern tribal communities? What are the experiences of 
other Anishinaabe7 tribal courts? Can these experiences be useful to other 
tribal courts around the nation? 
These are questions that are typical for tribal courts throughout In-
dian Country. They involve the examination of what I call "intratribal 
common law," or, "the common law applied by tribal courts and other 
tribal dispute resolution venues for disputes arising out of a tribal legal 
construct, such as the inheritance of a right to on-reservation hunting 
territories."s The answers to the questions-and with many of the ques-
tions, the answers are elusive-are dependent on reservation context to a 
very high degree. Moreover, they are critical unanswered questions be-
cause tribal constitutions and legislation order tribal courts to look to 
customary law as a device for interpreting tribal statutes and constitutions. 
And where statutes and constitutions are silent on a question, tribal courts 
often must first look to customary law, if any, to fill in the gap. 
This Article presumes that customary law is more easily discovered, 
understood, and applied in insular tribal community where there are few 
outsiders and the tribal language is widely spoken.9 Conversely, in tribal 
communities that are (for lack of a better word) assimilated, where the 
few members are surrounded and outnumbered by nonmembers, and 
4. [d. at 231. 
5. This Article uses the terms "customary laws," "custom," "traditional law," and 
"tribal custom and tradition" interchangeably. 
6. These tribes are the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, and 
the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma. 
7. "Anishinaabe" means "original people." Benjamin Ramirez-Shkwegnaabi, The 
Dynamics <if Diplomacy in the Great LAkes Region, 27 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 53, 72 
n.1 (2003). 
8. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Illtratribal Common LAw, 
43 HOUSTON L. REV. 701,707 (2006). 
9. Cj Alan Watson, An Approach to Customary LAw, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 569 
(discussing the generation of customary law in insular communities). 
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where the tribal language is all but dead, customary law is extremely diffi-
cult to discover, understand, and apply. The vast majority of tribal 
communities are somewhere along the spectrum between the two poles. 
Consider the following hypothetical:!O 
A newly married couple move into a new home on the Lake 
Matchimanitou Indian Reservation in Michigan. They live on 
trust land and both are citizens of the Lake Matchimanitou 
Band of Ottawa Indians. They have two children in the first 
three years of marriage. The husband's parents, who also live 
on the reservation but in an older home, become ill. One has a 
stroke and the other has diabetes. Both are unable to walk and 
require wheelchairs. Their home is not handicap-accessible, but 
the newlyweds' home is handicap-accessible. The husband and 
wife discuss the matter and offer to "trade" homes with his 
parents until they are able to return to their own home. His 
parents agree. They "trade" homes, but no contract, lease, or 
other document is executed memorializing the agreement. The 
wife is never happy with the new arrangement. The newly-
weds' relationship degenerates and the husband moves out, 
leaving the wife and their two children in the old house. The 
husband's parents, still living in the newlyweds' home, file suit 
in Lake Matchimanitou tribal court seeking the wife's eviction 
from the old home, while maintaining they will not move out 
of the new home. At trial, the wife alleges that she was coerced 
into agreeing to the "trade" due to the husband's threat of vio-
lence. 
The hypothetical presents a difficult but typical choice of law problem. In 
the absence of tribal statutory or common law, should customary law ap-
ply? How do the parties and the tribal court find the customary law? 
Should they follow the Ottawa First Book, assuming any of its provisions 
apply? 
Customary law still appears in many of the decisions of American 
state and federal courts. Customary law, part and parcel of the English 
common law adopted and adapted by the Founders of the United States,11 
appears as the basis of decision less often given that statutory and adminis-
trative law dominate the field. 
In contrast, the importance of customary law in American Indian 
tribal courts cannot be understated. Indian tribes now take every measure 
10. The fact pattern is based in part on Malaterre v. Estate if St. Claire, No. 05-007 
(Turtle Mountain Band Ct. App. 2006). 
11. Cj, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 
(1999) (applying the common law of England circa 1791 to the interpretation of the Sev-
enth Amendment). 
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conceivable to preserve Indigenous cultures and restore lost cultural 
knowledge and practices. Tribal court litigation, especially litigation in-
volving tribal members and issues arising out of tribal law, often turns on 
the ancient customs and traditions of the people. But this development of 
applying customary law in tribal courts is new and undertheorized. 
The literature discussing "customary law," "traditional law," "tribal 
custom and tradition," and "tribal common law" in modern American 
tribal courts lacks a compelling theory of the role of custom in tribal 
court jurisprudence. There are numerous empirical studies of the use of 
custom in tribal law and an even more numerous papers describing cus-
tom in tribal law. Most of these studies are limited to a small number of 
tribes, often just one. Nearly all studies of support the use of custom in 
tribal law, with some arguing that custom preserves the cultures of Indian 
people and others arguing that custom provides a better methodology of 
delivering justice to participants in tribal court adjudication. But little or 
no scholarship provides an adequate theory as to why tribal courts should 
rely on custom, nor does this scholarship assist tribal courts in deciding 
which law to apply. This Article attempts to provide a theory for the role 
of custom in tribal court jurisprudence that does both on a more general 
level. 
Part I notes the increasing importance to tribal policymakers and 
communities of (re)discovering tribal customary law. Part I also introduces 
H.L.A. Hart's theory of primary and secondary rules into the scholarship 
of tribal court jurisprudence. Part II offers a survey of tribal choice oflaw 
provisions that exemplify the legal manifestation of the importance of 
tribal customary law. Part III provides a quick survey of the role of cus-
tom in several prominent modern tribal court decisions. Part IV asserts 
that there are numerous practical limitations on tribal courts seeking to 
apply customary law, and numerous pitfalls or traps into which tribal 
court judges sometimes fall. Part V offers a normative theory for guiding 
tribal court judges in the assertion and application of tribal customary 
law. 
I. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Importance oj Customary Law 
The application of custom in modern American jurisprudence is 
enjoying a little bit of a renaissance. Professor Larry Kramer showed that 
even after the Declaration of Independence and the drafting of state con-
stitutions, American state courts continued to rely on the customary 
common law of English and Norman courts. 12 The Supreme Court relies 
12. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 41 (2004). 
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more and more on English common law as it existed at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The importance of 
these customary rules that formed English common law increases as 
courts and commentators delve deeper into the original understanding of 
the Founders. 
Unlike American constitutional law, which has no defining or man-
datory method of interpreting the Constitution,13 Indian tribal courts 
have specific charges to apply tribal customary or traditional law. Tribal 
choice of law statutes (some of them codified into tribal constitutions) 
and court rules often require tribal court judges to seek and apply tribal 
customary law if possible. Even Congress intended for tribal courts to 
apply customary law in interpreting the provisions of the Indian Bill of 
R · h 14 Ig ts. 
The application of the customary law of England as applied around 
the period of the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
makes a reasonable amount of sense because the Framers did not intend 
to depart too far from English common law. 15 While American leaders 
intended to create a much different constitutional system than the British 
understanding of constitutionalism,16 the same could not be said of Indian 
leaders. Many, if not most, tribal constitutions were ratified under a form 
of bureaucratic duress imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the 
Secretary of Interior. 17 While Indian people voted for these constitutions, 
the constitutions evince no intent by the People to adopt or incorporate 
the common law of the United States or England. ls 
These historical and political differences between the American 
Constitution and Indian tribal constitutions explain the reticence of many 
(but not all) Indian tribal law scholars to rely upon American court 
precedents. If followed to their origins, American precedents derive from 
Anglo-American jurisprudence and values, not tribal values. Hence, more 
and more tribal leaders and policymakers are requiring their tribal courts 
13. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 5 (2006). 
14. 25 U.s.c. § 1301 et seq. (2001). 
15. See KRAMER, supra note 12, at 40. 
16. See GORDONWOOD,THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,261 
(1969). 
17. E.g., Snowden v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan, 32 Indian L. 
Rep. 6047,6048-49 (Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Appellate Court 2005) (describing 
the history of the ratification of the tribal constitution). Cj Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) 
Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 108(}-83 (2007) (discussing "foundational" tribal 
governing principles). 
18. See generally Steve Aycock, Thoughts on Creating a Truly Tribal Jurisprudence, 
compiled in Indigenous Justice Systems of North America, 2nd Annual Indigenous Law 
Conference, Michigan State University College of Law (March 17-18,2006) (on file with 
author) (collecting and analyzing numerous tribal court decisions that rely upon federal or 
state common law principles and arguing that these tribal courts should focus more on 
tribal principles rather than American or English principles). 
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to seek, find, and apply tribal customary law. One important caveat, how-
ever, as I noted in my previous work: the customary laws of Indian tribes 
rarely (if ever) apply to the disputes that involve non-Indians. 19 
B. Hart's Primary and Secondary Rules 
The methods that most tribal judges use in finding and applying 
tribal customary law should be reconsidered in order to offer an answer to 
the problems in finding customary law and, once it is found, applying it. 
This Article suggests that an understanding of H.L.A. Hart's conception of 
"primary rules of obligation" and "secondary rules of recognition,,20 may 
assist tribal judges in their duties to locate and apply customary law. 
Under this theory, a tribal custom or tradition may be labeled a 
primary rule. Professor Hart conceived of primary rules as "imposing ob-
ligations ... [that] may be wholly customary in origin.,,21 A rule could be 
construed as a primary rule when "human conduct is made in some sense 
non-optional or obligatory.,,22 In this sense, primary rules impose an obli-
gation to conform behavior of the members of the community. These 
rules may include a prohibition on certain actions akin to crimes, subject 
to the imposition of a "hostile or critical reaction" or even "physical sanc-
tions.,,23 Or these primary rules may include "rules which require honesty 
or truth or require the keeping of promises ... thought of in terms of 
either 'obligation' or perhaps more often 'duty.' ,,24 Hart recognized that in 
theory a society could exist "where the only means of social control is 
that general attitude of the group towards its own standard modes of be-
haviour in terms of which we have characterized rules of obligation.,,25 
However, for Hart, "It is plain that only a small community closely knit 
by ties of kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable 
environment, could live successfully by such a regime of unofficial 
rules.,,26 
Professor Hart then identified a series of limitations on the appli-
cability of these primary rules. He identified three "defects" in the 
19. Compare Fletcher, Toward a Theory, supra note 8, at 728 ("[C]ases resolved using 
intratribal common law tend to involve tribal members to the exclusion of all others ... "), 
witiz Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter,]., concurring) (asserting that 
tribal law is "unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out"). 
20. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 95 (1961). 
21. Id. at 84. 
22. Id. at 80. 
23. Id. at 84. 
24. Id. at 85. 
25. Id. at 89. 
26. Id. at 89-90. See also id. at 244 (citing, among other works, K. N. LLEWELLYN & 
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941), "[£]or studies of the nearest approxima-
tions to this state"). 
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system-the uncertainty of the rules, the static character of the rules, and 
the inefficiency of the rules. 27 Primary rules are uncertain, Hart argued, 
because "if doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to the precise scope 
of some given rule, there will be no procedure for settling this doubt, ei-
ther by reference to an authoritative text or to an official whose 
declarations on the point are authoritative.,,28 Primary rules have the 
problem of being static in that "[t]he only mode of change ... will be the 
slow process of growth ... and the converse process of decay ... There will 
be no means ... of deliberately adapting the rules to changing circum-
stances, either by eliminating old rules or introducing new ones .... ,,29 
Finally, the enforcement of primary rules is inefficient because there may 
be "no agency specially empowered to ascertain finally, and authoritatively, 
the fact of violation.,,3u 
The "remedy" for these defects is the creation of secondary rules.3\ 
These rules "specifY the ways in which the primary rules may be conclu-
sively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their 
violation conclusively determined.,,32 For each defect that Professor Hart 
recognized in the primary rules, he identified a means to interpret the 
primary rules so as to remedy the defect - or secondary rules. 33 For the 
problem of uncertainty, he proposed a "rule of recognition," some ac-
knowledgement that the primary rule is "authoritative, i.e. as the proper way 
of disposing of doubts as to the existence of the rule.,,34 This can take the 
form of a choice of law statute or court rule or even a common law deci-
sion by the court that the rule is authoritative. 35 Professor Hart's remedy 
for the static character of primary rules is related. He refers to the remedy 
as introducing "rule[s] of change ... which empowers an individual or 
body of persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the 
life of the group.,,36 In more advanced societies, this could include a legis-
lature or tribal council.37 
The remedy for the third defect-and the focus of Parts III, IV, and 
V of this Article-are "rules of adjudication.,,38 These rules create an entity 
that will make decisions about disputes: "[T]hese rules ... define a group 
of important legal concepts: in this case the concepts of judge or court, 
27. HART, supra note 20, at 89-91. 
28. ld. at 90. 
29. ld. 
30. ld. at 91. 
31. ld. at 91-92. 
32. ld. at 92. 
33. See id. at 92-95. 
34. ld. at 92. 
35. See id. at 92-93. 
36. ld. at 93. 
37. See id. at 93-94. 
38. ld. at 94. 
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jurisdiction and judgment.,,39 These rules, according to Professor Hart, also 
are rules of recognition because the judge or court must identifY "what 
the rules are" in addition to making "authoritative determinations of the 
fact that a rule has been broken.,,40 This is the rub for purposes of this Ar-
ticle. As Professor Hart concludes: 
Unlike an authoritative text or a statute book, judgments may 
not be couched in general terms and their use as authoritative 
guides depends on a somewhat shaky inference from particular 
decisions, and the reliability of this must fluctuate with both 
the skill of the interpreter and the consistency of the judges.41 
The remainder of this Article will frame the annunciation and appli-
cation of customary law in tribal courts using Professor Hart's framework. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF CUSTOM IN TRIBAL COURT 
DECISIONMAKING: RULES OF RECOGNITION AND CHANGE 
Many tribal constitutions, tribal court codes and ordinances, and 
tribal court rules require the use of customary law in tribal court deci-
sionmaking.42 And there are tribal courts that are not required to use 
customary law or even precluded from using customary law in certain 
circumstances. The various statutes and rules offer varying ways and means 
for the use of customary law. This Part provides a quick survey of several 
examples of these rules of recognition and change, in Professor Hart's vo-
cabulary. 
A. Tribal Constitutional Provisions 
The constitution of the Passamaquoddy Tribe in Maine offers one 
example of a constitutional mandate for using customary law. The relevant 
provision reads: 
Civil disputes which are within the jurisdiction of the Pas-
samaquoddy Tribal Court shall, to the extent consistent with 
applicable tribal laws, ordinances, customs, and usages, as well 
as applicable provisions of federal Indian law, be resolved by 
the Tribal Court in acc;ordance with any corresponding provi-
sions of the applicable civil laws and remedies of the State of 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 94-95. 
41. [d. at 95. 
42. It should be noted that not all Indian tribes employ tribal courts to resolve dis-
putes. However, this Article will focus on tribes that have chosen to authorize court 
systems. 
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Maine, and such laws and remedies shall to that extent be 
deemed adopted as the law of the Pleasant Point Reservation 
of the Passamaquoddy Tribe. 43 
This provision allows the tribal court to apply tribal customary law on par 
with tribal statutes and applicable federal and state law. The provision al-
lows for the tribal court to declare the existence and applicability of 
customary law as the law of the tribe. 
In contrast, the Constitution of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa 
and Chippewa Indians is silent as to customary law. The constitution pro-
vides, "This Constitution, ordinances, resolutions, regulations, and judicial 
decisions of the Band shall govern all people subject to the Grand Trav-
erse Band's jurisdiction.,,44 Silence does not preclude the Grand Traverse 
Band tribal courts from applying customary law in its decisions, how-
45 
ever. 
B. Tribal Statutes 
Tribal legislatures provide many different hierarchies and procedures 
in their choice of law provisions. The White Earth Band of Chippewa 
Indians Judicial Code, for example, requires the tribal court to "[reduce] 
to writing with a historical justification therefore" any tribal "tradition 
and custom" it chooses to follow. 46 The decisions of the tribal court "shall 
become a precedential guide for the unwritten tradition, customs or laws 
so as to allow future Judges and litigants to be guided on the traditional 
law and custom.,,47 Customary law is ranked on par with "other laws" in 
the choice oflaw hierarchy.48 The tribal court may, if doubt arises, "request 
the advice and assistance of the panel of elders.,,49 This statute provides 
clearer guidance to the White Earth Band tribal court than many other 
tribal choice of law provisions. The code provides that the tribal court 
may announce customary law and is not required, unless it chooses, to 
43. CONST. OF THE SIPAYIK MEMBERS OF THE PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE art. VIII, § 1, 
available at http://www.wabanaki.com/tribaI_constitution.htm. 
44. CONST. OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS art. 
VI, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/ constitution/GTBcons3.html. 
45. See, e.g., Novak Const. Co. v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians, No. 00-09-423-APp, at 3 (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
Ct. App. 2001) ("There are many wrongs that do not have a right to a remedy in areas 
beyond sovereign immunity. This type of fiat has been accepted in all jurisdictions and 
does not defY Native American traditions held by the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indian Tribe."). 
46. WHITE EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS JUDICIAL CODE ch. VII, § 6(a), avail-
able at http://www.tribaIresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/white_earthjudicial.htm. 
47. ld. 
48. ld. § 6(b). 
49. ld. 
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consult with tribal elders on customary law. Moreover, the code mandates 
that the tribal court follow any customary law that it announces. Finally, 
the code requires that the tribal court reduce to writing unwritten cus-
tomary law that it announces so that it may be used as precedent. 
The Oglala Sioux Tribe Law and Order Code authorizes the tribal 
code to use customary law, but only if the custom does not conflict with 
tribal statutes and federal law. The statute provides, "[T]he Oglala Sioux 
Tribal Court shall give binding effect to ... any applicable custom or us-
age of the Oglala Sioux Tribe not in conflict with any of the Tribe or 
United States."so As with the White Earth Band statute, "[w]here doubt 
arises as to such customs and usages, the Court may request the testimony, 
as witnesses of the Court, of personal [sic] familiar with such customs and 
usages.,,5! The Oglala Sioux legislature made clear that customary law is 
not on par with tribal law or even federal law. Of course, it is a distinct 
possibility that the legislature did not or could not act without interfer-
ence from federal officials, as is often the case where the tribal 
constitution requires the approval of the Secretary of Interior in the en-
actment of tribal codes.52 
The Stockbridge-Munsee Community of Mohican Indians' tribal 
court code is similar in some respect to the White Earth Band's code, but 
applies only to the rules of procedure for the tribal court. The code pro-
vides: 
[The Tribal Court Code] is exempted from the rule of strict 
construction. It shall be read and understood in a manner that 
gives full effect to the purposes for which it is enacted. When-
ever there is uncertainty or a question as to the interpretation 
of certain provisions of this code, tribal law or custom shall be 
controlling and where appropriate may be based on the writ-
ten or oral testimony of a qualified tribal elder, historian or 
other representative. 53 
As with other tribal court codes, the Stockbridge-Munsee tribal court 
can and should seek the advice of a tribal person with relevant knowl-
edge. This particular statute is different in that the tribal legislature has 
50. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAW AND ORDER CODE ch. II, § 20.27(c), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/oglala_lawandorder2.htm. 
51. Id. 
52. CONST. AND By-LAWS OF THE OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE INDIAN 
RESERVATION OF SOUTH DAKOTA art. Xl, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ 
ccfolder/oglala_constandbylaws.htm(,,[N]o amendment shall become effective until it 
shall have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior."). 
53. STOCKBRIDGE-MuNSEE TRIBAL LAW TRIBAL COURT CODE ch. I, § 1.3(B), availaiJIe 
at http://www.mohican-nsn.gov/TribaIOrdinances/TribaIOrdinances.htm (follow "Tribal 
Court Code" hyperlink). 
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mandated that customary law be used not as substantive law but as an in-
terpretive device to be used to interpret the tribal court code. 
The Bay Mills Indian Community's tribal court code puts custom-
ary law on par with tribal statutes and applicable federal law, so long as the 
custom does not conflict with federal law: 
In all civil actions, the Tribal Court shall apply the applicable 
laws of the United States, any authorized regulations of the 
Department of Interior which may be applicable, any ordi-
nance of the Bay Mills Indian Community, and any custom of 
the Chippewa Tribe not prohibited by the laws of the United 
States.54 
The Bay Mills tribal court, however, must "request the advice of persons 
familiar with these customs and usage's [sic] .,,55 
Other tribal statutes emphasize the use of customary law in certain 
types of disputes. The Little River Band of Ottawa Indians' Children's 
Code provides "because of the vital interest of the Tribe in its children 
and those children who may become members of the Tribe, this Code, 
other ordinances, regulations, public policies, recognized customs and 
common law of the Tribe shall control in any proceeding involving a 
child who is a member of the Tribe.,,56 
C. Tribal Court Rules 
The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska's rule is similar to the Oglala 
Sioux statute. The rule mandates that the tribal court "apply traditional 
Tribal customs and usages, which shall be called the common law," but 
only if no tribal statute answers the legal question. 57 The rule also provides 
that, "[w]hen in doubt as to the Tribal common law, the Court may re-
54. BAY MILLS INDIAN CMTY. TRIBAL CODE ch. IV; Law Applicable to Civil Actions, 
§§ A, available at http://www.baymills.org/tribalcourt/. 
55. Id. at §§ B. 
56. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CODE ch. 900, § 3.08(a), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/litderiver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm#ch3. See 
also id. § 3.08(c) ("The substantive law and procedures for the state courts shall not be 
binding upon the Children's Court except where specifically provided for in this Code. In 
the absence of promulgated rules of procedure, procedural rules of the State of Michigan 
shall be utilized as a guide. Michigan case law may serve as a guide for the Court but shall 
not be binding. Any matters not covered by the substantive laws, regulations, customs or 
common law of the Litde River Band of Ottawa, or by applicable federal laws or regula-
tions, may be decided by the Children's Court according to the laws of the State of 
Michigan."). 
57. WINNEBAGO TRIBAL COURT CODE tit. 1, Art. 1, § 1-109, available at http:// 
www.winnebagotribe.com/court.htm. 
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quest the advice of counselors and Tribal elders familiar with it."s8 Winne-
bago civil court rules further provide: 
1. In all civil cases, the tribal court shall apply: 
A. The constitution, statutes, and common law of the 
Tribe not prohibited by applicable federal law, and, if 
none, then 
B. The federal law including federal common law, and, if 
none, then 
C. The laws of any state or other jurisdiction which the 
Court finds to be compatible with the public policy 
and needs of the Tribe. 
2. No federal or state law shall be applied to a civil action 
pursuant to paragraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (1) of 
this section if such law is inconsistent with the laws of 
the Tribe or the public policy of the Tribe. 
3. Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of 
the Tribe, the Court, either on its own motion or the 
motion of any party, may subpoena and request the ad-
vice of elders and counselors familiar with those customs 
d 59 an usages. 
This rule has been interpreted by the Winnebago Supreme Court,60 
as discussed below. 
D. The Hoopa Rule 
The most detailed, complicated, ambitious, and (probably) unwork-
able tribal rule relating to customary law is Section 2.1.04 of the Hoopa 
Valley Tribal Code. First, the code provides that customary law must be 
used by the tribal court where tribal statute is silent. 6 ! Second, the code 
provides a detailed procedure for determining what the tribal customs 
are.
62 The first step in the procedure is to determine if the tribal custom 
was written: "If the traditional Tribal law has been acknowledged by a 
58. [d. 
59. WINNEBAGO TRIBAL COURT CODE tit. 2, art. 1, § 2-111, available at http:// 
www.winnebagotribe.com!court.htm. 
60. See Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150, 6156-57 (Winnebago Tribe of 
Neb. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
61. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, ch. 1, § 2.1.04, available at http://www.hoopa-
nsn.gov! departments!tribalcourt! code2.htm#Civil1. 
62. See id. § 2. 1. 04 (b) ("Where the parties choose to fonow the civil procedures of 
Title 2, in any dispute, claim, or action, in which a party asserts that traditional Tribal law 
governs the outcome, the Court must first determine what the traditional law is."). 
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legal writing of the Tribe the Court will apply the written law.,,63 Tribal 
custom is "written" if the Hoopa tribal council has taken action that 
amounts to a ratification of the custom: 
Evidence that a traditional law is written includes written ref-
erence to a traditional law, right, or custom in a Tribal 
resolution, motion, order, ordinance or other document acted 
upon by the Tribal Council. Anthropological writings or pub-
lications, and personal writings are not evidence that the 
traditional law is written, but may be presented as persuasive or 
supporting evidence that the traditional law or custom exists.64 
So, in the case of the Hoopa tribe, the tribal council may announce cus-
tomary law to the exclusion of the tribal court, but the code still 
authorizes the tribal court to announce customary law after following a 
complex procedure that includes the selection of expert witnesses similar 
to the way litigants sometimes select arbitrators and a hearing (or series of 
hearings) in which the tribal court may issue a "Conclusion of Law" de-
claring the customary law of the tribe.65 
63. Id. 
64. Id. § 2.1.04(b)(1). 
65. See id. § 2.1.04: 
(c) In any dispute ... in which a party asserts that traditional Tribal law 
governs the outcome ... , the Court will hold a hearing to detennine 
what the traditional law is. 
(1) The parties may stipulate to what the traditional law to be applied is 
(2) 
(A) If the parties do not stipulate ... , each party shall be allowed to 
call their own expert witnesses ... . 
(B) Each party shall submit a list of Tribal elders' names that they 
wish to call as expert witnesses .... 
(C) Each party shall also submit to the Court a list of Tribal mem-
bers' names that the party believes to be neutral and impartial, 
and knowledgeable of traditional Tribal law. The Court shall se-
lect from the submitted list names of individuals to act as expert 
witnesses for the Court. 
(3) The Court ... [will] detennine[e] how many neutral and impartial 
expert witnesses may testifY .... The parties will have the right to 
Voir Dire the witnesses to detennine if they are, in fact, knowledge-
able of traditional Tribal law. 
(d) After the expert witnesses have been determined, ... [the] Court will 
then detennine which questions will be asked of each of the expert 
witnesses .... 
(e) After hearing the expert witnesses' testimony the Court will issue a 
Conclusion of Law in which the Court will state what it has found to 
be the traditional Tribal law .... [T]he Court may re-issue or amend 
and re-issue the Conclusion of Law, or repeat the process as defined 
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The Hoopa rule is a serious attempt to deal with many of the po-
tential problems relating to discovering, recovering, and applying 
customary law. Reasonable minds can differ as to the meaning or validity 
of tribal customs and traditions and the rule attempts to create a proce-
dure that alleviates these concerns. But the rule's adopting of an 
arbitration-style hearing involving a battle of tribal elders as expert wit-
nesses has, in the experience of the author as former staff attorney and 
current appellate judge for the Tribe, prevented the application of any 
customary law in Hoopa courts. 
III. THE USE OF CUSTOM IN TRIBAL COURT OPINIONS: 
APPLICATIONS OF THE RULES OF ADJUDICATION 
As would be expected by a student of Professor Hart's theory of 
primary and secondary rules, tribal courts vary in the ways that they find, 
analyze, and apply tribal customary law. Most tribal courts cannot rely 
upon customary law for various reasons. They are unaware of it or, if they 
are aware of it, no customary law they are aware of applies to the fact pat-
tern at issue. It is important to discuss instances of tribal courts applying 
customary law to locate methods of finding, analyzing, and applying cus-
tomary law in order to discern the strengths and weaknesses of their 
methods. Tribal courts that cannot or do not apply much custom in their 
analysis can learn from these courts. 
A. Tribal Court Opinions Relying upon Custom: A Snapshot 
This section is grouped into pairings of different courts applying 
custom in a similar fact situation. The first pairing compares the applica-
bility and the extent of the Miranda warnings in Indian Country where 
the tribal legislature has adopted legislation requiring the application of 
Miranda. In this first pairing, the tribal court is using custom to interpret 
ambiguities in a statute. The second pairing compares two tribal courts 
applying custom as a gap-filler in cases where the parties have argued the 
justiciability (normally an exclusively federal court question) of a matter 
before the court. 
herein, selecting different neutral and impartial witnesses and/or a dif-
ferent set of questions to be asked of the expert witnesses. 
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1. Miranda Warnings 
a. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez 
In Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez,66 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court 
determined that the Nation's law enforcement officers must give the 
Miranda warnings to every suspect in custody.67 The Court was not mak-
ing new law in the case-"these are the rights already recognized by the 
Kayenta Police District in their advice of rights form, and we confirm 
here that they apply across the Navajo Nation.,,68 The United States Con-
stitution did not require this result because the Constitution does not 
apply to Indian tribes.69 The Navajo Nation does not have a written con-
stitution,70 but the Navajo legislature has enacted a Navajo Bill of 
Rights. 71 Section 8 of the Navajo Bill of Rights protects suspects from 
being "compelled ... to be a witness against themselves.,,72 The Court 
recognized that the Navajo statute tracked the Indian Civil Rights Act 
and the Fifth Amendment. 73 Navajo statutory law requires that the Navajo 
courts take the "Fundamental Laws of the Dine" into consideration when 
interpreting statutory language such as the Navajo Bill of Rights. 74 As 
such, the Court held that the "[Navajo] Bill of Rights, as informed by the 
Navajo value of individual freedom, prohibits coerced confessions.,,75 
The Rodriguez Court made it clear that the interpretation of the 
English words prohibiting self-incrimination would be interpreted in light 
of Navajo customary law. Despite the fact that the language of the Navajo 
66. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 11 (Navajo 2004), available at 
http://www.navajocourts.orglindex3.htm (follow "Supreme Court Opinions" hyperlink). 
67. See id. at 8 ("We hereby interpret the right against self-incrimination to require, 
at a minimum, clear notice by the police in a custodial situation that the person in custody 
(1) has the right to remain silent and may request the presence of legal counsel during 
questioning, (2) that any statements can be used against him or her, (3) the right to an 
attorney, and (4) the right to have an attorney appointed if he or she cannot afford an 
attorney.") . 
68. !d. 
69. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
70. See DINE BI BEENAHAZ'AANII (THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE DINE), NAVAJO 
NATION CODE tit. 1, § 201-06, available at http://www.navajocourts.org (follow the "Na-
vajo Nation Code" hyperlink). 
71. See Rodriguez at 5 (quoting the Navajo Bill of Rights, codified at NAVAJO NA-
TION CODE tit. 1, § 8); James W Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo Common LAw, 50 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 523,538 n. 91 (2001). 
72. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 1, § 8. 
73. Rodriguez at 5 (quoting 25 U.S.C § 1302(4) and U.S. CONST. amend.V). 
74. [d. at 7 (citing Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CN-69-02 (Nov. 1,2002». See 
also Judy v.White, No. SC-CV-35-02, 2004.NANN.0000007, at 'Il55 (Navajo 2004), avail-
able at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinionsI2004.NANN.0000007.htm. 
75. Rodriguez at 5. 
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Bill of Rights tracked the language of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the 
Fifth Amendment, the Court asserted that "Navajo understanding of the 
English words adopted in statutes may differ from the accepted Anglo 
understanding.,,76 In the criminal procedure context of the Rodriguez case, 
the Court noted that the "modern Navajo government, which includes 
institutions such as police, jails, and courts[,] .,. track state and federal 
government structures not present in traditional Navajo society.,,77 The 
Court's analysis went deep into the customs and traditions of the Dine, 
leading to the following statement of tribal common law: 
We are not guided in our own criminal jurisprudence by a 
legacy of internal oppression. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme 
Court's discussion [in Miranda v. Arizona] reminds us of our 
Navajo principle of hazh6'6go. Hazh6'6go is not a man-made 
law, but rather a fundamental tenet informing us how we must 
approach each other as individuals. When discussions become 
heated, whether in a family setting, in a community meeting 
or between any people, it's not uncommon for an elderly per-
son to stand and say "hazh6'6go, hazh6'6go sha'alch{n{ [hazh6'6go, 
hazh6'6go, my children]. The intent is to remind those involved 
that they are Nohookaa Dine'C [human beings], dealing with 
another Nohookaa Dine'e, and that therefore patience and re-
spect are due. When faced with important matters, it is 
inappropriate to rush to conclusion or to push a decision 
without explanation and consideration to those involved. 
AM66 na'n{[e'dii e{ dooda [Delicate matters and things of impor-
tance must not be approached recklessly, carelessly, or with 
indifference to consequences.]. This is hazh6'6go, and we see 
that this is an underlying principle in everyday dealings with 
relatives and other individuals, as well as an underlying princi-
ple in our governmental institutions. Modern court procedures 
and our other adopted ways are all intended to be conducted 
with hazh6'6go in mind.78 
The Rodriguez Court then applied this statement of law to the facts 
at hand-the Kayenta district law enforcement officers did not read or 
provide the Miranda warnings to the suspect in the language of the Dine, 
nor did they explain them to the suspect in either English or Navajo.79 
Law enforcement also threatened the suspect with 60 years of prison in a 
76. [d. at 7. 
77. [d. at 8 (citing Mitchell v. Davis, No. SC-CV-S2-03, slip op. at 3-4 (Navajo 
2004), available at http://www.navajocourts.orglindex3.htm (follow "Supreme Court 
Opinions" hyperlink). 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. See id. at 1-2. 
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federal penitentiary and a $1.5 million fine. 8I ' The Court reasoned, "We 
must never forget that the accused is still NollOOkcul DinC'r, and that he or 
she is entitled to truthful explanation and respectful relations regardless of 
the nature of the crime that is alleged.,,81 The Court concluded that the 
officers' conduct toward the suspect did not "conform with the ways that 
people should interact."s2 The Court vacated the conviction.8) 
The Rodriguez Court's result was to extend criminal procedure 
rights of suspects in the custody of the Navajo Nation's law enforcement 
officers beyond that which is required by federal or state law. This is not 
unusual for the Navajo Nation's courts. 84 
More interesting is the reasoning for applying the Miranda warnings 
in the first instance. The Miranda Court focused on the police practices of 
the day, emphasizing their psychological impacts on the suspect.8S But the 
Court had little choice but to acknowledge that law enforcement na-
tionwide had long engaged in physical abuse and coercion to elicit 
confessions.86 Aside from physical abuse, the Court noted that law en-
forcement used psychological coercion on suspects, relying upon police 
interrogation manuals of the time. 87 The Court concluded that warnings 
were necessary, in part because of the need to protect "human dignity,,,88 
but more so because "no statement obtained from the defendant can truly 
be the product of his free choice.,,89 In other words, a more critical pur-
pose for the use of Miranda warnings by state and federal officers is to 
ensure that confessions will be truthful. 
80. See id. at 1. 
81. !d. at 10. 
82. ld. 
83. See id. at 12. 
84. See id. at 8 ("We have applied federal interpretations, but have augmented them 
with Navajo values, often providing broader rights than that provided in the equivalent 
federal provision.") (citing Duncan v. Shiprock Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-51-04, at 8, n. 5 
(Navajo 2004), available at http://www.navajocourts.orglindex3.htm (follow "Supreme 
Court Opinions" hyperlink); Fort Defiance Hous. Corp. v. Lowe, No. SC-CV-32-03, at 4-
5 (Navajo 2004), available at http://www.navajocourts.orglindex3.htm (follow "Supreme 
Court Opinions" hyperlink». 
85. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-57 (1966). 
86. See id. at 446 (describing beatings and the use of lighted cigarettes to coerce 
suspects and witnesses into confessing in criminal cases). 
87. ld. at 449-50 ("If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the 
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived 
of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or 
recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indis-
cretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other 
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator 
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the 
law.") (quoting CHARLES O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 99 (1956». 
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
89. ld. at 458. 
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The Rodriguez Court was more concerned not with whether the 
confessions or statements taken by Kayenta District law enforcement were 
truthful, but the relationships between members of the Navajo commu-
nity. While the Court reached a conclusion that the Miranda warnings 
applied to suspects held in tribal law enforcement custody, the Court ex-
panded those rights to require that officers treat suspects like relatives, 
with respect and dignity. As the Court wrote, "[A] police badge cannot 
eliminate an officer's duty to act toward others in compliance with the 
. . I f I I' , , ,,90 pnnClp es o. laZ to ogo. 
The Rodriguez Court incorporated tribal customary law by relying 
on the language of the Navajo people as a source of custom and tradition. 
Unlike most tribal court judges, Navajo judges must be fluent in the lan-
guage of the people."1 Rodriguez is an example where the Court drew 
upon its understanding of the language to derive important rules of con-
duct for tribal police officers. For the Navajo people, it is the Navajo 
language that is the source of the community's customs and traditions. 
b. CrowTribe of Indians v. Big Man 
In Crow Tribe oj Indians v. Big Man,92 the Crow Court of Appeals held 
that "criminal defendants are entitled to Miranda [sic] protections when 
they are prosecuted in the Crow Tribal Court.,,93 The Big Man Court rec-
ognized that Miranda does not apply in tribal courts as a matter of 
American constitutional law,94 but also recognized that the Indian Civil 
Rights Act might serve to extend Anglo-American criminal procedure 
protections to tribal court defendants.os The Court dipped into the legis-
lative history of the Act and found (like the u.s. Supreme Court did) that 
interpretation of the Act "will frequently depend on question[s] of tribal 
tradition and custom ... ,,96 
But the Big Man Court noted that the Crow legislature had adopted 
a rule of criminal procedure "that appears to parallel the requirement un-
der current federal constitutional law[, i.e., Miranda].,,97 The Court noted 
90. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, W-l1(Navajo 2004). 
91. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 354(E) (2005) ("Each [judge] must be able to 
speak both Navajo and English, and have some knowledge of Navajo culture and tradi-
tion."). 
92. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Big Man, 2000 Crow 7, 2000.NACT.0000007 (Crow 
Ct. App. 2000), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinionsI2000NACT.0000007.htm. 
93. ld. at '\I 33. 
94. See id. at '\119 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. 
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)). 
95. See id. (citing 25 U.S.c. §§ 1301-1303). See also id. at '\121 (citing 25 U.s.c. 
§§ 1302(4) ("due process"), (8) ("equal protection")). 
96. !d. at '\123 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978)). 
97. ld. at '\127. 
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that the Miranda warnings are "not grounded in Tribal custom or tradi-
tion-nor is the rest of the adversarial criminal prosecution process set 
out in the Crow Rules of Criminal Procedure.,,98 The Court, constricted 
by the tribal legislature's decision to adopt the Miranda rule, applied fed-
eral precedent to decide the case.99 
2. Justiciability Doctrines 
a. Village of Mishongnovi v. Humeyestewa 
In Village of Mishongnovi v. Humeyestewa,100 the Hopi Tribe's appellate 
court reversed a lower decision dismissing a complaint on federal standing 
and political question grounds. 101 The underlying dispute involved the 
control of a bank account held in the name of the Village of 
Mishongnovi. 102 The alleged traditional leader of the community (kik-
mongwl) and his supporters brought suit against the village Board of 
Directors, who were acting under the apparent authority vested in them 
by a 1992 election. 103 The lower court dismissed the claim, relying upon 
the federal standing doctrine. 104 
Hopi common law and positive law both appear to require the 
Hopi courts follow a rule whereby "the customs, traditions and culture of 
the Hopi Tribe must take precedence in a court's decision of what law to 
apply before a court reaches the use of any foreign law, including federal 
or Arizona state law.,,\o5 Hopi law creates a choice of law hierarchy for 
Hopi courts to follow. In a previous case, Hopi Indian Credit Assoc. v. Tho-
mas,I06 the Court held that Hopi law, either customary or statutory, must 
apply before any "foreign law," that is, federal or state law. 107 The Hopi In-
dian Credit Court explained in great detail the procedure later Hopi 
courts must follow in applying Hopi customary law. First, "[a] party who 
intends to raise an issue of unwritten custom, tradition or culture shall 
9S. [d. 
99. See id. at ~~ 37-50. 
100. Village ofMishongnovi v. Humeyestawa, No. 96APOOOOOS, 1995.NAHT.0000017 
(Hopi Ct. App. 1995), available at http;//www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/ 
1995.NAHT.0000017.htm. 
101. See id. at ~~ 30-59 (standing), ~~ 60-66 (political question doctrine). 
102. See id. at ~~ S, 10. 
103. See id. at ~ 10. 
104. Seeid.at~~17-1S. 
105. [d. at ~ 39 (quoting Hopi Indian Credit Assoc. v. Thomas, No. AP-001-S4, 
1996.NAHT.0000007, at ~ 25 (Hopi Ct. App. 1996)}. 
106. Hopi Indian Credit Assoc. v. Thomas, No. AP-001-S4, 1996.NAHT.0000007 
(Hopi Ct. App. 1996), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/ 
1996.NAHT.0000007.htm. 
107. [d. at ~ 25. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. J. Race & L. 77 2007-2008
FALL 2007] Rethinking Customary Law 77 
give notice to the other party and the court through its pleading or other 
reasonable written notice. The intent of this notice is to prevent unfair 
surprise, which is consistent with Hopi custom and tradition of fair-
ness.,,108 Second, "[t]he proponent of Hopi customs, traditions and culture 
must then (1) plead them to the court with sufficient evidence so as to 
establish the existence of such a custom, tradition or culture, and then (2) 
show that the recognized custom, tradition or culture is relevant to the 
issue before the court.,,109 Third, the court may apply customary law "if it 
finds the custom, tradition or culture to be generally known and accepted 
within the Hopi Tribe" via judicial notice." ll Moreover, even if the parties 
do not please customary law, the Hopi courts are obligated to "take judi-
cial notice of and then apply Hopi custom, tradition or culture when it is 
1· bl ,,111 app lca e. 
The rationale of the Hopi appellate court for adopting these proce-
dures was two-fold. First, the application of Hopi customary law, the 
Court asserted, was important to reconciling the Anglo-American legal 
constructs that formed the basis of Hopi positive law with the need and 
desirability for applying Hopi customary law where possible: 
The customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi Tribe deserve 
great respect in tribal courts, for even as the Hopi Tribal 
Council has merged laws and regulations into a form familiar 
to American legal scholars, the essence of our Hopi law, as 
practiced, remains distinctly Hopi. The Hopi tribe has a consti-
tution, ordinances and resolutions, but those Western forms of 
law codity the customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi 
Tribe, which are the essential sources of our jurisprudence. 112 
Second, the Court acknowledged the practical difficulties with dis-
covering and applying Hopi customary law: 
Hopi customs, traditions and culture are often unwritten, and 
this fact can make them more difficult to define or apply. 
While they can and should be used in a court of law, it is 
much easier to use codified foreign laws. That ease of use may 
convince a trial court to forego the difficulty and time needed 
to properly apply our unwritten customs, traditions and cul-
ture. However, the trial court must apply this important source 
of law when it is relevant. 113 
108. [d. at ~ 30. 
109. [d. at ~ 31 (citation and footnote omitted). 
110. [d. at ~ 32. 
111. !d. at ~ 33. 
112. [d. at ~ 24. 
113. [d. at ~ 28. 
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Both of these factors came into play in the Hllmeyestewa case. The 
defendant relied upon the federal doctrines of standing and political ques-
tion-both questions going to the justiciability of cases before federal 
courts-in their arguments supporting the motion to dismiss the action. 114 
The trial court agreed, relying upon a previous case Shllngopavi v. Qllama-
hongnewa, which had held that a claim by a group of elected officials in 
the Village of Shungopavi against individuals who had once been village 
leaders was barred by the plaintiffs' lack of standing. 115 That court sought 
Hopi customary law on standing and, finding none, applied federallaw. 116 
b. Rave v. Reynolds 
In Rave v. Reynolds,117 the Winnebago Supreme Court held (among 
many other things) that tribal members and a tribal member organization 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality the rules for tribal elec-
tions under tribal law. 118 In Rave, the tribal government defendants argued 
that "voters, tribal members, and organizations composed of interested 
tribal voters ... lacked the necessary personal stake or interest in the con-
troversy .... ,.119 The Court noted that the defendants cited "only federal 
cases brought under article III of the United States Constitution .... ,,120 
The Rave Court's analysis often relied upon customary law as the 
Court understood it, but it sometimes relied on federal law as well. 121 The 
Court first found, however, that the tribal court rules mandated that "[i]n 
all civil actions the tribal court shall apply ... [t]he constitution, statutes, 
and common law of the tribe ... ,,122 The Court interpreted this provision 
to mean that "the Winnebago tribal courts prefer tribal law as a rule of 
decision to any rule afforded by federal and state law. Resort to federal or 
state law therefore is appropriate to inform the tribal courts of a rule of 
114. See Village of Mishongnovi v. Humeyestawa, No. 96AP000008, 
1998.NAHT.0000017, 17 (Hopi Ct. App. 1998). 
115. See id. at ~~ 35-36 (discussing Shungopavi v. Quamahongnewa, No. 
95CV000097, Order and Decision (1997)). 
116. Id. at ~ 36. 
117. 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150 (Winnebago Tribe of Neb. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
118. Id. at 6159. 
119. Id. at 6156. 
120. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555 (1992); Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 US. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 US. 166 (1974)). 
121. To be fair, Chief Justice Clinton wrote an opinion that covered 22 pages in the 
Indian Law Reporter, which given the small font of the Reporter, is probably equivalent 
to 75-100 pages of regular writing-and he did so in under 30 days. See Rave, 23 Indian L. 
Rep. at 6151. 
122. Id. at 6156 (quoting WINNEBAGO (NEB.) CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2-
111(1)(A), available at http;//www.winnebagotribe.com/court.htm). 
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decision only if tribal law is completely silent on the question.,,123 The 
Court further interpreted "common law of the tribe" to mean two differ-
ent types of law: 
First, the term common law may reference the western style 
common law derived from English legal roots, i.e., the judge-
made law articulated in decided cases through written opin-
ions often reflecting the judicial understanding of the customs 
and practices of a people in a particular sector of endeavor. 
Such common law may include both already existing decisions 
and any new rule of law announced by a tribal court in a case 
before it. 
Second, ... section 2-111 contemplates that tribal customs and 
usages, both traditional and evolving, will constitute tribal 
common law. 124 
The Court found that no tribal constitutional or statutory provision ap-
plied in the standing analysis. 125 
The Rave Court then chose to announce tribal customary law as it 
applied to the standing analysis. The Court held that the strict federal 
standing requirements do not apply in their fullest extent to tribal court 
litigants, holding that it would rely upon: 
the healing approach traditionally taken to resolve tribal dis-
putes. The traditions of most Indian tribes in the United States, 
including the Ho-Chunk people, part of whom compose the 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, encouraged participatory and 
consensual resolution of disputes, maximizing the opportunity 
for airing grievances (i.e., hearing), participation, and resolu-
tion in the interest of healing the participants and preventing 
friction within the tribal community. 126 
The Court presented a very long string cite of authorities in support of 
this proposition, none if which, it appears, mention Ho-Chunk tradi-
tions. 127 The majority of the citations focused on the Navajo Nation. 128 
123. Id. 
124. Rave, 23 Indian L. Rep. at 6157. 
125. See id. ("Neither party cited and this court is unaware of any express provisions 
in the tribal constitution or statutes that deal with standing or of any decided cases of the 
Winnebago tribal courts that have previously addressed the issue."). 
126. Id. (citations omitted). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. The citations include:Tom Tso, TIle Process if Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225,227-34 (1989);Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions arId Fairness in the 
Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15 (1992); Robert Yazzie, "Life 
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Other citations involved other Indian nations, such as the New York 
tribes,129 and other citations focused on peacemaker courts130 or alternative 
dispute resolution. 131 
The Rave Court buttressed its announcement of tribal customary 
law with candid pragmatism through an announcement of public policy: 
In small, close-knit tribal communities, like the Winnebago 
tribe of Nebraska, denying an opportunity to air and heal 
grievances in a neutral forum otherwise possessed of jurisdic-
tion, such as the tribal courts, could have disruptive effects by 
sowing dissention, hostility and distrust that otherwise could 
be ameliorated by airing and resolving the dispute. Accord-
ingly, adopting the narrow standing rules employed in federal 
courts could have a disruptive impact on tribal communities 
and, accordingly, would not constitute sound public policy. 132 
The Court noted that the tribal government's attorneys represented 
to the Court (Without being able to cite to any authority on the matter) 
during oral argument that "whatever participatory mechanism might have 
existed then subsequently devolved participatory dispute resolution tradi-
tions on the tribal council, but not the Winnebago courts.,,133 This 
argument appeared to be a weak claim that the tribal courts had no juris-
diction over the case at all. The Court rejected that argument and held 
that "whatever tribal traditions previously controlled tribal council, clan 
or family dispute resolution in the mid-nineteenth century must, in the 
absence of express tribal positive law on standing, affect this court's reso-
lution of the standing issue.,,134 
The Rave Court then turned to the question of the extent that fed-
eral standing law would apply in the dispute. 135 The Court first noted that 
federal courts, unlike the Winnebago tribal court, are courts of limited, 
not general, jurisdiction. 136 The Court, parsing through the federal cases, 
Comes From It"; Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 185-87 (1994); James W 
Zion, TIle Navajo Peacemaker Court: Diference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983); Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, The Navajo Peace-
maker Court Manual (1982). 
129. Id. (citing N.Y. Indian Law § 46 (discussing Seneca Nation of Indians' peace-
maker courts)). 
130. Id. (citing Collected Papers from National Conference on Traditional Peace-
making RemakingJustice (Sept. 20-22, 1993, Arizona State University)). 
131. Id. (citing National Indian Justice Center, Alternative Dispute Resolution Man-
ual (1989)). 
132. Id. at 6158. 
133. Id. at 6157. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 6158-59. 
136. [d. at 6158 (comparing WINNEBAGO TRIBAL COURT CODE tit. 1,Art. 1, § 1-105 
through 1-108 with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Valley Forge 
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announced a general rule on standing: "[S]tanding, and therefore the req-
uisite interest or stake in the controversy, requires that the party assert 
some actual or threatened injury that is logically related to the legal claims 
they seek to present to the court.,,137 Drawing upon "the traditions of 
openness to the healing of disputes which have long characterized tradi-
tional Indian healing dispute resolution,,,138 the Court declined to adopt 
any of the federal courts' limitations on the broad principle stated above, 
such as limitations on generalized grievances139 and whether the matter is 
redressable by the court. 140 The Court's announced rule read as follows: 
Therefore, as a matter of tribal law, the standing questions pre-
sented by the defendants must be resolved by inquiring 
whether the plaintiffs asserted some actual or threatened injury 
that is logically related to the legal claims they sought to pre-
sent to the tribal court. HI 
As such, the Court held that any and all tribal members and tribal mem-
ber organizations have standing to challenge tribal elections on the basis 
that governmental action violated their "rights to free speech, [to] petition 
the government for redress, and freedom of political association ... 142 The 
Court also held that tribal members had standing to bring claims alleging 
that the tribal government violated the tribal constitution in allegedly 
placing individuals on the ballot that did not meet the qualifications. 143 
B. The Dearth cifTribal Custom in Tribal Court Opinions 
Tribal courts rely more and more on custom as authority when they 
decide cases, but still precious few tribal court cases cite to custom as per-
suasive or controlling authority. The chief judge of the Colville 
Confederated Tribes tribal court, Steve Aycock, conducted a survey of 
Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 US. 464 
(1982); United States v. Richardson, 418 US. 166 (1974)). 
137. [d. (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Data Processing 
Servo v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,151-54 (1970)). 
138. [d. 
139. [d. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555; Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights 
Ass'n, 426 US. 26 (1976); Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States V. Richard-
son, 418 US. 166 (1974)). 
140. [d. (citing Warth V. Seldin, 422 US. 490 (1975)). 
141. /d. See also id. at 6159 ("[The tribal member organization] CHANGE also had 
standing to challenge those same procedures on behalf of those members since the interest 
asserted is germane to the association's purpose of improving tribal government .... "). 
142. See id. at 6158. 
143. See id. at 6158 (citing CONST. OF THE WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEB. art. VI). 
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tribal court opinions and was disturbed to find how often tribal courts 
adopt Anglo-American common law legal doctrines. I" 
There are numerous practical reasons for the lack of citation to 
tribal custom. First, tribal custom is difficult to discover for tribal judges 
and parties. Custom may be so ingrained in the language of the tribe that 
it cannot be translated in an accurate or meaningful way into English. In 
addition, the tribe's language speakers may be limited in number, mini-
mizing the utility of the language in tribal courts. Even where custom is 
translatable into English, often it is difficult to reach back into the tribe's 
past to recover the custom. Students of tribal custom often must resort to 
the work of anthropologists and ethnohistorians, few of whom are mem-
bers of the communities they study. While speakers of the tribe's language 
are in a much better position to understand custom, outsiders who are 
tribal judges or counsel to tribal court litigants have little or no ability to 
do so. 
Second, it is difficult to achieve consensus on the tribal custom in 
question. This problem is related to the first problem in that there may be 
few tribal speakers to relate the relevant custom. It may be unpractical to 
tap the knowledge of tribal speakers during litigation. And, unfortunately, 
the very few speakers of the language may disagree amongst themselves or 
they may be unreliable relators of the relevant custom. For custom that 
might be discovered by reliance upon academic works, the problem may 
be that the academics writing in the field also disagree on the custom or 
are unreliable relators. 
Third, few tribal judges who are tribal members are law-trained and 
are less likely to write opinions that might help to expound customary 
law for future litigations. Moreover, since most intratribal common law 
only applies where all the parties are members of the tribe, it is conceiv-
able that the announcement of the law may be in the language of the 
tribal community. A corollary is that few tribal judges who are lawyers are 
members of the tribal community. While these judges are more likely to 
deliver written opinions in a matter, and (to a lesser extent) even cite to 
tribal custom, they tend not to be reliable relators. As a result, the opinions 
of tribal court judges who are not members of the community may push 
the common law of the community in an erratic and even illegitimate 
direction. 
Fourth, customary law may have limited utility in modern disputes. 
Customary law may be too broad or vague to apply to a specific set of 
circumstances arising from a dispute between Indians. Or customary law 
may be too specific, with the relevant law applying only to limited fact 
patterns that tend not to arise in the modern world. Customary law also 
144. See Steve Aycock, Thoughts on Creating a Truly Tribal Jurisprudence, compiled ill 
Conference Materials, Indigenous Justice Systems of North America, 2nd Annual Indige-
nous Law Conference, Michigan State University College of Law (March 17-18, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
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might be too elementary, with prohibitions on conduct, for example, al-
ready prohibited via statute. 
Fifth, customary law might not carry enough moral weight to le-
gitimate its use. The prescriptions of the past and of the ancestors could 
be replaced with new rules that are inconsistent with the old law. These 
new rules might be statutory or based in tribal court decisions or they 
may be new customs recognized by the tribal community. After all, cul-
tures never remain static. They adapt and adopt and always are changing. 
Sixth, litigants in tribal courts often do not cite to customary law. 
Litigants that are unrepresented in tribal courts are more likely to refer to 
customary law than others, but they might not have the training develop 
the reference in a manner sufficient to be useful to the tribal court. Liti-
gants who are represented by community lay advocates or tribal member 
attorneys would be in a better position to assert customary law, but these 
litigants tend to rely on Anglo-American law or intertribal common law, 
rather than customary law. Litigants that are represented by counsel who 
are unfamiliar with tribal courts and tribal court practice tend not to refer 
to customary law at all. Lawyers and law advocates go for the most cost-
effective presentation to the court-and that means reliance upon what 
the Hopi Indian Credit Court referred to as "foreign laW.,,145 Briefing in 
appellate cases and in trial court motions practice is designed, in part, to 
alert the court to the existence of relevant authority. When the briefs in a 
tribal court case come in, they almost never point to customary law, mak-
ing the tribal court's task harder. 
Seventh, customary law might be preempted by the adoption of a 
statute that forecloses the application of relevant custom or tradition. The 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community adopted the State 
of Oregon's commercial code in a manner that could be construed to 
preclude the interpretation of that code using customary law, although it 
seems as if it should not. 146 
Eighth, and perhaps most importantly, many tribal court judges do 
not feel competent to announce or apply tribal customary law. One ap-
pellate court panel wrote: 
Most assuredly, it is not the cross we bear as an appellate court 
to right every alleged wrong, to predicate and postulate the re-
deeming righteousness of conduct we approve and abhor by 
decision the perceived unrighteousness of tribal conduct 
within a cultural setting that just may view issues in a manner 
foreign to our own sense of justice. Decisions predicated on 
145. Hopi Indian Credit Assoc. v. Thomas, No. AP-OOl-84, 1996.NAHT.0000007, 
at '\J 25 (Hopi Ct. App. 1996), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/ 
1996.NAHT.0000007.htm. 
146. See CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNny TRIBAL COURT 
ORDINANCE § 310(g)(2) (1998), available at http://weblink.grandronde.org/. 
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cultural tradition and the need to preserve the very existence 
of the tribe are better left to tribal members as constituents, 
the tribal advocates, the tribal council and the elder statesmen 
of the tribe to be decided in the context of political and social 
change within their culture. Never to be decided on the basis 
of whim and fancy of an appellate court substituting its judg-
ment on tradition and cultural values peculiar to but most 
assuredly, part of that very tribal culture. 147 
C. Categories of Application qfTribal Customary Law 
When tribal courts in written opinions do cite to custom, they of-
ten do so in a superficial manner, without reference to specific precedents. 
Far more often than not, tribal court citation to custom amounts to noth-
ing more than a citation to a broad, vague notion to tribal values. And 
often these tribal values are pan-tribal values-values that the tribal courts 
recognize are inherent to many or even most tribes. This is a trap for 
tribal court judges, one that they should take care to avoid. 
There are at least three different characterizations this Article will 
make in describing the typical application of tribal customary law in tribal 
court opinions. These three are: (1) basis of decision; (2) modification; and 
(3) gut check or sugar coating. All but a very few tribal court opinions 
that apply tribal customary law fit into one (or more) of these categories. 
1. Basis of Decision 
Only in extremely rare occasions in tribal court opinions available 
in the public domain does a tribal court judge apply tribal customary law 
as the basis of decision. As I speculated in my earlier work,148 tribal cus-
tomary law serves as the controlling law in tribal court cases only where 
the parties consent to its application or where all of the parties are mem-
bers of the tribe and understand the law as applied. A careful review of the 
few thousand tribal court opinions available in the Indian Law Reporter, 
the Oklahoma Tribal Court Reports, the Northwest Intertribal Court 
System Reporter, the Southwester Intertribal Court of Appeals Reporter, 
the Tribal Court Reporter, VersusLaw, LEXIS, WESTLAW, and individual 
tribal court websites reveals few cases in which tribal court decisions are 
based on tribal customary law as the basis of decisions. Cases in which it 
could be said that tribal customary law is controlling (and whether this is 
true remains arguable for all of them) mostly come from the insular tribal 
147. Ed. ofTr. v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6033, 6036 (Northern Plains Intertribal 
Ct. App. 1990). 
148. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 728-33. 
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communities in the desert southwest, Alaskan native villages, or other in-
sular communities. An important factor in the limited availability of these 
decisions to non-Indians and nonmember Indians is the likelihood that 
these cases are adjudicated in the language of the people. 
Professor Justin Richland's description of one of these cases out of 
the Hopi tribal court is instructive. 149 Professor Richland reviewed 30 
hours of audio recordings in a tribal court cases regarding a property dis-
putes between tribal members. I 5<) In 14 of 15 cases from 1995 to 2002 
involving these disputes, litigants resorted to assertions of tribal customary 
law in support of their position. 151 Richland analyzed one hearing in de-
tail, James v. Smith,152 most of which was conducted in the Hopi 
I 153 anguage. 
Given that these cases are not litigated in English or with a written 
opinion, it is very difficult to study these cases universally. Many of these 
cases are decided informally, without the burden of imposing formal legal 
rules. 154 That does not mean that there are very few of these cases-likely, 
there are many hundred or even thousands a year-but they are not avail-
able for easy analysis. Nevertheless, these cases are where the tribal courts 
understand and apply traditional law in a manner most reflective of the 
tribe's customs and traditions. The sole limitation of this category of ap-
plying tribal customary law is subject matter. Unlike many tribes that have 
faced down more assimilation or have been subject to more importation 
of non-Indian people and culture, insular tribal communities are more 
likely to retain the same or similar kinds oflifeways that custom and tradi-
tion developed over time to protect. The Hopi property disputes, for 
example, are closely related to the property ownership structure that the 
Hopi people have used since time immemorial. 155 The property dispute 
discussed at the beginning of this Article arising out of the Turtle Moun-
tain Band reservation has little similarity to the kinds of disputes that 
Ojibwe and Cree customary law was developed to resolve. 
Relatively few tribes or tribal judges have the understanding to ap-
ply traditional law in this manner. And relatively few subject matters 
tackled by tribal courts that appear in the available materials can be de-
cided by resort to customary law. They must resort to alternative methods. 
149. See Justin B. Richland, "What are You Going to Do with the Village's Knowledge?" 
Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAW & SOC'y REv.,June 2005, at 235. 
150. [d. at 246. 
151. [d. at 247. 
152. [d. at 250. 
153. [d. at 250-58. 
154. See Watson, supra note 9, at 569-70 (explaining that disputes in small communi-
ties are often resolved based on the appointed adjudicator's perception of fairness rather 
than on "a definitive legal rule"). 
155. See Richland, supra note 149, at 246-47 (describing the link between the Hopi 
culture and property disputes). 
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2. Modification 
A still infrequent but more common use of tribal customary law is 
to apply a custom or tradition as a means of modifYing an Anglo-
American legal rule or an intertribal common law rule. 156 In these in-
stances, the tribal court identifies a rule that does not derive from the 
tribe's customary law with which to use in deciding the case. However, an 
aspect of the rule may conflict with an understanding of customary law. 
The tribal court will often still apply the foreign rule,157 but modifY as 
much as possible in order to make it conform to understandings of cus-
tomary law. Much of the very best applications of intertribal common law 
follow this pattern. 
Take, for example, the Hopi Tribe's appellate court decision in Vil-
lage <if Mishongnovi v. Humeyestewa. 158 There, the appellate court reviewed 
the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on standing and justicia-
bility, applying only the very essentials of the rules on standing and chose 
to discard the rest. 159 The court adopted a standing test that required 
plaintiffs to make a showing of a logical relationship between an actual or 
threatened injury,160 as opposed to federal law, which would have required 
a showing of injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual 
or imminent.161 This narrow definition of standing was inconsistent with 
both the Hopi constitution and the customs and traditions of the Hopi 
people. 162 As such, the Hopi appellate court amended the rule to conform 
to tribal customs. 
The application of tribal customary law in this context often has ad-
vantages, but is still fraught with peril. The advantages include the 
potential to discover new applications to customary rules. As Vine Deloria 
and Clifford Lytle suggested decades ago,163 tribal courts cannot hope to 
rely only on customary law, noting that cultures and legal regimes change 
over time, and that tribal law must also develop to meet the needs of 
modern tribal societies. An additional advantage is that tribal courts will 
be more likely to take the time to discover customary law, or require that 
litigants help them discover the law. Tribal court judges that take seriously 
the charge to discover and apply customary law have an excellent oppor-
156. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 720-28 (describing intertribal common law). 
157. Watson, supra note 9, at 570 ("In perplexing cases, the [feudal or Roman] courts 
frequently based their decisions upon foreign customs."). 
158. No. 96AP000008, 1998.NAHT.0000017 (Hopi Ct. App. 1998), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/oPinions/1998.NAHT.0000017.htm· 
159.seeid.at '\1'\130-55. 
160. [d. at '\155. 
161. [d. at '\1 44 (citing Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
162. See id. at '\1'\148-52. 
163. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 
(1983). 
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tunity to develop and harmonize tribal customs and traditions with the 
modern needs of Indian people. 
The peril includes the careless invocation of intertribal common law 
or, worse, the invocation of pan-Indian customs. Non-Indian and non-
member Indian tribal judges (and scholars) have a limited means of 
accessing or understanding the customs and traditions of the tribe for 
which they work. One trap is to research and apply the customs and tra-
ditions of other Indian tribes, such as the Navajo Nation, in particular. A 
relatively large amount of outstanding and groundbreaking scholarly ma-
terial has developed about the Navajo common law and Navajo tribal 
court decision making process. l64 The experiences and advances made by 
that Nation's courts are unprecedented in Indian tribal court history-but 
the customs and traditions of the Navajo Nation are not the customs and 
traditions of any other tribe. The court in Rave v. Reynolds,165 deciding 
many of the same standing issues that the Hopi Tribe's appellate court 
decided in Village oj Humeyestewa, cited to a series of authorities on the 
Navajo Nation's tribal courts for the proposition that Indians tribes prefer 
an open "healing approach" to dispute resolution, rather than the adver-
sarial process. 166 The court cited to no authorities discussing the lifeways 
of the Ho-Chunk people, leaving aside for the moment whether the 
available authorities were valid. 167 While the Rave court appeared to make 
no significant error-indeed, the Hopi appellate court adopted the rule as 
modified by the Rave coure68-the potential for carelessness existed. This 
carelessness may include the method of adopting a superficial view of 
tribal customs and traditions by relying upon pan-Indian notions of In-
dian people. 
The recommendations in Part V will focus on this category, given 
that this may be the category with the most potential for the develop-
ment of tribal law in the foreseeable future. 
164. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger,jllstice and the Olltsider:jllrisdiction over Nonmembers in 
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. L.56J. 1047 (2005); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Evolving 
Indigenolls Law: Navajo Marriage, ClIltllral Traditions, and Modern Challenges, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 283 (2000); Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal COllrts, 31 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 225 (1989); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": Navajojllstice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. 
REV. 175 (1994);JamesW Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo Common Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 
523 (2002). 
165. 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150 (Winnebago Tribe of Neb. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
166. Rave, 23 Indian L. Rep. at 6157 (citing Tso, sllpra note 164;Tom Tso, Moral Prin-
ciples, Traditions and Fairness in the Navajo Nation Code of jlldicial Condllct, 76 JUDICATURE 15 
(1992); Yazzie, sllpra note 164; James W. Zion, TIle Navajo Peacemaker COllrt: Deference to the 
Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983); other authorities 
omitted). 
167. E.g., PAUL RADIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A WINNEBAGO INDIAN (1963). 
168. Village ofMishongnovi v. Humeyestewa, No. 96AP000008, 1998.NAHT.0000017, 
at ~ 52 (Hopi Ct. App. 1998) (citing Rave with approval), available at http://www.tribal-
institute.org/opinions/1998.NAHT.0000017.htm. 
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Another common use of tribal customary law in tribal court opin-
ions is as a "gut check" or, worse, "sugar coating." This occurs when a 
tribal court judge has decided to apply an Anglo-American legal rule 
from a state or federal court case or an intertribal common law rule as the 
basis of decision. The judge then compares these rules that will form the 
basis of decision to an articulation of the judge's understanding of tribal 
customary law. If the foreign rule is consistent or otherwise does not con-
flict with the tribal custom or tradition, then the court is satisfied that the 
application of the foreign rule is acceptable. No modification of the for-
eign rule is made. The application of customary law as gut check does 
little to advance the importance, relevance, and understanding of tribal 
custom and tradition. 
There are some explanations as to why this method of applying 
tribal customary law is so prevalent. The subject matter of the dispute in 
question simply may have no antecedent in the tribe's customs and tradi-
tions, for example. Or perhaps the foreign rule to be applied actually is 
consistent with the tribe's customs and traditions. Nevertheless, there 
should be fewer (and hopefully one day, no) cases in which a tribal judge 
required to apply customary law should ever resort to using the gut check 
method. 
IV. A NOTE ON THE PROBLEM OF FINDING TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
The cases discussed in the previous two parts highlight the difficul-
ties with finding, understanding, and applying customary law in deciding 
matters in complex litigation before tribal courts. Two of the cases were 
decided by the Navajo and Hopi tribal courts. These courts examined, 
understood, and applied customary law but did so in the context of the 
federal common law rules-the Miranda warnings and the justiciability 
doctrine of standing. The other two cases struggled mightily to find and 
apply customary law. The Crow case, for all practical purposes, gave up 
without finding or applying Absaalooke custom and tradition to its analy-
sis of the Miranda warnings in the context of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 
In that case, the tribal legislature had adopted rules requiring law en-
forcement to follow the mandates of the Miranda case, further precluding 
the court's capacity to apply customary law, even if it had located any. The 
final case, decided by the Winnebago Supreme Court, did rely upon 
broad, general notions of pan-Indian dispute resolution. But the Court 
could not find any specific legal or other authority that described the Ho-
Chunk people's customary means of dispute resolution and, in fact, relied 
upon writings about the Navajo people's (modern) customs and traditions 
about dispute resolution in Navajo tribal courts. The Winnebago court fell 
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into a trap of applying broad, vague notions of pan-Indian culture that 
might or might not have been applicable in Ho-Chunk communities. The 
court further made the mistake of grabbing the mantle of asserting au-
thority to declare customary law, when it had no serious basis for doing 
so. 
This Article is intended to provide a template for finding, under-
standing, and applying customary law that all tribes can follow. Not all 
tribal courts will need to consider this template. And some tribal courts 
may be constricted by their rules or governing statutes and constitutions 
from taking these steps. But this Article is intended to advance the discus-
sion about the role that custom plays in tribal court jurisprudence-a 
discussion that is sorely lacking. 
The first subsection of this Part provides a very general description 
of a template or roadmap for tribal courts to follow when they are obli-
gated to find and apply tribal customary law. The template is general and 
may have several weaknesses, some of which are discussed in the second 
subsection of this Part. 
A. The Template for Finding Customary Law 
Tribal choice of law provisions that require or encourage the appli-
cation of tribal custom and tradition tend not to provide a procedure or 
any guidance at all as to how a tribal court is to go about the business of 
finding, understanding, and applying tribal customary law. Some tribal 
courts that do make a serious effort to apply customary law are hampered 
by the lack of guidance. Others assert expansive authority to declare cus-
tomary law. What tribal choice of law provisions should include-or what 
tribal courts can include in their court rules-is a roadmap for finding, 
understanding, and applying customary law. 
For tribal judges who are not experts in the culture and traditions of 
the community for which they are a judge, including those who do not 
understand the traditional language of the community or those who are 
not even members of the community, finding customary law is extraordi-
narily difficult. For judges who do understand their tribal language and 
do have a strong connection to the community for which they are a 
judge, the task is made much easier, but is not obvious. 
There are numerous sources for tribal judges to use when looking 
for customary law. The parties to the litigation should be (but in practice 
almost never are) the first source. The Rave Court's attempt to glean tribal 
customary law from the government's attorneys (Who were non-Indians, 
it appears) was the right place to start, but the result was disappointing. 
Many tribal court judges, in this author's experience, start off by asking 
counsel for the parties to brief and argue customary law for few, if any, 
lawyers and advocates have anything to contribute. The government's 
counsel in Rave, most dangerously, made representations about tribal 
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customs without citing authority-they were guessing, it seems. Had the 
Rave Court adopted those representations made by the government's at-
torneys as customary law, the outcome of the case would have come out 
the other way, precedent would have existed on the tribal court's books 
based on what appears to be the misguided or even uneducated guesses of 
a non-Indian lawyer's bald assertions. While tribal choice oflaw provisions 
and the realities of complex litigation all but require tribal courts to ask 
the parties for guidance, the Rave litigation suggests that the guidance 
might not be very helpful. 
Most tribal courts stop right there. The costs of seeking out custom-
ary law when the parties cannot assist are high for tribal court judges and 
tribal court staff. Often, tribal judges don't know where to look next. But 
some tribal judges do know where to look next. The second source for 
tribal court judges is the inherent knowledge. Navajo judges, for example, 
must be fluent in the language of the Navajo people. A clear understand-
ing of the language, with all its nuances and complexities, is essential to 
finding tribal customs and traditions. For many tribal communities, the 
law is encoded right into the language-and the stories generated from 
the language. A mere translation of the stories into English may leave out 
fundamental fine distinctions, subtle nuances, and even correct meaning. A 
native speaker would be able to use the language as a means for discover-
ing the law. But, as the realities of tribal communities dictate, there are few 
tribal judges who are native speakers. This source, while having the poten-
tial of being the finest source available, does not solve the problem for 
most tribal courts. 
A third possible source for tribal courts looking for customary law is 
secondary literature about tribal customs and traditions. There is no short-
age of anthropologists, historians, sociologists, and other social science 
professors and graduate students that study American Indian peoples. 
There is a large subset of writing and work by these academics that de-
scribes and (sometimes) analyzes tribal customs and traditions. There is a 
smaller and relatively undiscovered subset of this work--some of which 
has been done by lawyers or law professors-that describes and analyzes 
these customs and traditions as customary law. A good researcher could 
locate and deliver this work to tribal judges for perusal. The possibilities of 
this strategy are considerable, but the limitations might make this strategy 
unworkable or even counterproductive. The next subsection will identifY 
and weigh these advantages and disadvantages. 
A fourth source for tribal courts are the people of the community-
often elders-who are cognizant of the community's customs and tradi-
tions. Other than a tribal judge who fits in this category, this is the next 
best ideal source for tribal customary law. There is a blurring in the dis-
tinction between the two--some tribes select tribal judges because they 
are elders. 
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A fifth source includes the written work of tribal community mem-
bers. This work can take the form of academic research, translation by 
others of the oral stories and histories of Indian people and Indian tribes, 
and even fiction, poetry, stories, and legends told and written by tribal 
community members. There is more and more literature in this regard. 
Many, if not most, tribal courts will have little option but to resort 
to academic literature and other written works. The next subsection dis-
cusses the general potential and limitations of these sources. 
B. Problems with the Sources oj Customary Law 
Not every source of customary law is comprehensive or legitimate. 
This subsection details the possible strengths and weaknesses of using the 
written word of academics as a source and the written or oral word of 
tribal community members as sources of customary law. 
1. The Academic Literature 
Vine Deloria and others have long criticized the work of non-
Indian anthropologists and other researchers and scientists. There is a very 
significant bias by Indian people against the work of these academics. This 
bias, whether reasonable or not, will be a formidable obstacle to any tribal 
court judge using written academic literature as a basis for finding and 
understanding the customary law of a tribal community. The legitimacy 
of a tribal court opinion declaring customary law based on the findings of 
an academic would be in serious doubt much of the time. 
But the fact of the matter remains that, for many tribal communities, 
the work of non-Indian academics is the only source for tribal histories, 
legends, political science, religious practices, and even customary laws. For 
these communities, it could be foolish to ignore this work. The work 
might be 100 years old or very recent. It might contain commentary that 
offends every Indian person within a thousand miles of its unveiling, but 
tribal judges might be able to see through the academic jargon and bias to 
learn something significant. 
Or not. 
2. Tribal Community "Experts" 
The use of live tribal community members as expert witnesses for 
the finding and understanding of customary law is laudable, but also very 
flawed. There are numerous difficulties, the least of which is finding In-
dian people willing and qualified to participate in tribal court litigation, 
either as expert witnesses or even as a decisionmaking body not subject to 
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impeachment by counsel. Many Indian people do not want to talk about 
their deepest, most fundamental beliefs. Many that are willing do not 
want to do so for litigation purposes. 
Another problem-one that this author is very sensitive and careful 
in discussing-is the legitimacy of the representations made by tribal 
community "experts." Reasonable minds may differ on customs and tradi-
tions. Classic examples include the differences between practitioners of 
the Native American Church and the Navajo traditional religion at Na-
vajo and the differences between the Midewiwin and other Anishinaabe 
traditional religions. But there may be fundamental differences in the un-
derstanding of the culture and traditions of a community on family or 
political lines. Of course, none of this is any different than the differences 
in understanding of Anglo-American law between law professors. Tribal 
courts, as in the procedure for identifying Hoopa customary law, would 
be in the unenviable position of choosing between competing under-
standings of customary law-and this would be a choice that tribal courts 
might not have the institutional capacity to make. 169 
3. The Problem of Tribal Courts Announcing Customary Law 
The question of institutional capacity for tribal courts and tribal 
judges in announcing or declaring tribal customary law is complicated 
and very important. Judges in federal and state courts are common law 
courts in the mode of English common law courts but, while many tribal 
courts are modeled on American common law courts, tribal judges should 
not have the same notion that they can declare tribal common law. While 
Justice Rehnquist can rely upon English common law decisions issued 
around the time of the American Revolution as a source of authority for 
the origins of many American common law doctrines, tribal judges do 
not have the same sources of authority upon which to rely. 
The issue raises the question of whether, as the Northern Plains In-
tertribal appellate court wrote in 1990, tribal courts should be 
announcing or declaring tribal customary law. Of course, some tribal en-
tity has to do it and the court and its judges should be involved, but to 
what extent? The Rave Court acted in a manner similar to state and fed-
eral common law courts by announcing customary law as tribal common 
law, but the Court appeared to adopt Navajo understandings of dispute 
resolution that were not necessarily Ho-Chunk understandings. 
Tribal customary law as applied by tribal courts now follows (or is 
moving in the direction of) a pattern similar to the theory of opinio neces-
sitatus, or the theory that "individuals purposely follow a certain rule 
169. Cj Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal 
Constitutions, 14 KAN.].L. & PUB. POL'y 561,562-64 (2004) (discussing the difficulty of 
analyzing tribal religious practices as a scholar). 
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simply because they believe it be a rule oflaw.,,17o According to Alan Wat-
son, "Under this view, custom becomes law when it is known to be law, is 
accepted as law, and is practiced as law by persons who share the same 
legal system.,,171 So, tribal courts' adoption or announcement of tribal cus-
tomary law is an acknowledgment that a certain custom or tradition 
remains viable within the community. 
However, this view "contains no mechanism for deleting law that no 
longer commands approval.,,172 In Professor Watson's words, "[S]uppose 
that once the custom is known to be law and is accepted as law, the prac-
tice changes. Does the old law cease to be law, and the new practice 
become law?,,173 
Another issue-again, a very sensitive subject-is whether tribal 
judges who are not members of the community should be announcing 
tribal customary law as the law of the tribe. The question is one that each 
tribal community should face, ask itself, and answer in an official and 
comprehensive manner. 
V. RETHINKING CUSTOMARY LAW IN TRIBAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE: 
EMPLOYING RULES OF ADJUDICATION 
Some tribes and tribal courts, without referencing Professor Hart's 
theory, have already engaged in portions of this analysis; namely, by adopt-
ing rules of recognition and change. These are the tribes such as the ones 
discussed in Part II that have adopted choice of law statues or common 
law holdings incorporating tribal customary law. Tribal courts often are 
required to recognize tribal customs and traditions as persuasive or even 
controlling law. However, like Jed Rubenfeld noted about American con-
stitutional law,174 tribes have not adopted rules for how to find and apply 
customary law. Part III identified representative examples of how tribal 
courts find and apply customary law and critiqued them. Part IV offered a 
normative discussion on finding and announcing tribal customary law. 
This final part of the Article will highlight two methods for applying cus-
tomary law, only one of which will be endorsed. 




174. Cj RUBENFELD, supra note 13, at 5 ("In constitutional law ... there are no such 
overarching interpretive precepts or protocols. There are no official interpretive rules at 
all.") . 
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Indian cultures (often) were and are oral cultures. As noted by some, 
including for example Keith Basso,175 the customs and traditions of Indian 
people often are buried within the peoples' language, stories, and even the 
geographic terrain of their homelands. One method of teasing out a 
tribe's primary rules may be to focus on important and fundamental rules 
articulated in the tribe's language. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, as 
exemplified in the Rodriguez case discussed above, employs this method in 
a wide majority of its cases. 
The method, in a nutshell, involves this process: First, the tribal court 
identifies an important and fundamental value signified by a word or 
phrase in the tribal language. In the case of the Navajo Nation courts, the 
judges often identify the word hazh6'6go. As the court noted in Rodriguez, 
"Hazh6'6go is not a man-made law, but rather a fundamental tenet in-
forming us how we must approach each other as individuals.,,176 
Hazh6'6go is, for lack of a better term, a primary rule. Rodriguez involved 
the application of an Anglo-American legal construct to tribal criminal 
prosecutions (the Miranda rule), a secondary rule, to borrow once again 
from Professor Hart. The application of the tribal primary rule to the An-
glo-American or intertribal secondary rule is necessary to harmonize 
these outside rules to the tribe's customs and traditions. In the words of 
the Rodriguez Court, "Modern court procedures and our other adopted 
ways are all intended to be conducted with hazh6'6go in mind.,,177 As a 
result, the Navajo court stiffened the Miranda rule far more than the Su-
preme Court would require state or federal courts to in similar 
. 178 
cIrcumstances. 
This method may be transferable to other tribal courts as well. For 
example, many Anishinaabe people from the Great Lakes region are 
taught how to live in ni-noo' -do-da-di-win', or harmony.179 These Indian 
people should live what some refer to as the "Good Life," or bimaadizi-
win. 180 A Leech Lake Ojibwe elder defined the bimaadiziwin as follows: 
175. See KEITH BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE 
WESTERN APACHE 40 (1996). 
176. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 10 (Navajo 2004), available at 
http://www.navajocourts.orglindex3.htm (follow "Supreme Court Opinions" hyperlink). 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 12. 
179. See EDWARD BENTON-BANAl, THE MISHOMIS BOOK: THE VOICE OF THE OJIBWAY 
113 (1988). 
180. Lawrence W Gross, Cultural Sovereignty and Native American Hermeneutics in the 
Interpretation ojthe Sacred Stones of the Anishinaabe, 18 WlCAZO SA REV. 127,128 (2003). See 
also BENTON-BANAl, supra note 179, at 12 (referring to ba-ba'-ma-di-zi-win' as "journey"). 
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Every day you will learn something different, every day a new 
piece of knowledge. That's the way you live your life [Mii i'w 
akeyaa bimaadiziyan]. Then you approach those things a little 
more to hear them, to see them. And the Spirit shares. That's 




"Although the Anishinaabe themselves are loath[e] to establish a limited, 
set definition of [bimaadiziwin], some of the parameters of the Good Life 
include humility, generosity, and kindness.,,182 These could be identified by 
Anishinaabe tribal judges as the primary rules of the Anishinaabe people. 
They provide the ground rules for behavior in Anishinaabe communities 
and provide interpretative parameters for Anishinaabe tribal judges. 183 The 
adjudicative work of tribal judges would follow from these understand-
ings in much the same way as the Navajo judges perform their work. 
There will be concerns that many Anishinaabe tribal judges are un-
qualified to interpret bimaadiziwin in the context of a modern dispute that 
turns into complex litigation. More likely than not, these judges will not 
speak or read Anishinaabemowin, the language, but that should not pre-
clude the attempt to apply these primary rules. 
The critical advantage to identifYing primary rules first as the 
method of identifYing customary law is that it allows tribal courts to 
bring customary law into the modern era without creating much addi-
tional confusion as to the application of the law. The primary rule of 
bimaadiziwin may serve to affect, perhaps, the application of state and fed-
eral law analogs in a tribal election dispute or a tribal personnel dispute. 
This is another way of applying a form of "judicial minimalism" into 
tribal court jurisprudence in a manner similar to that advocated by Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein. 184 
B. Case Method 
Another method, which we may label the "case method," may be 
the equivalent of a federal or state court attempting to encapsulate a ques-
tion within the larger context of a paradigmatic Supreme Court case such 
as Miranda v. Arizona185 or Johnson v. M' Intosh. 186 It would be tempting to 
181. Hartley White, This is a Good Way if Life [Onizhishin o'ow BimaadiziwinJ, itl LIV-
ING OUR LANGUAGE: 0JIBWE TALES & ORAL HISTORIES, 216, 219 (Anton Treuer, ed. 2001). 
182. Gross, supra note 180, at 128. 
183. Cf id. at 128-29. 
184. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
185. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
186. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
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dust off the Ottawa First Book lB7 for guidance as to modern disputes, as 
suggested in the introduction to this Article. Or to dig into the more de-
tailed collection of Cheyenne tribal cases described (famously) by 
Professors Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel lBB or the Zuni case (not 
so famously) by Watson Smith and John Roberts. 189 But these cases are the 
results of adjudications by judges and leaders of an older time. As Lle-
wellyn and Hoebel wrote, "Cases are of course themselves no substitute 
for sound theory ... ,,190 These case compendiums offer little to modern 
tribal courts, unless a tribal judge can extract from them a primary rule 
that sustains the tribal community even today. But one suspects that the 
non-Indian compilers of these cases would not have been able to see that 
primary rule, especially if buried in the language of the people. 
A variation of this method may be to identifY a paradigmatic tribal 
story or stories that have some relevance to the dispute at issue. Professor 
John Borrows suggested this concept in his work. 191 It is more difficult to 
see the relevance of tribal legends and stories to modern dispute resolu-
tion in the manner Borrows suggests. For example, Borrows draws the 
rule in administrative law cases that all administrative remedies must be 
exhausted, with notice given to all affected parties, from the story of the 
Duck Dinner, in which the Anishinaabe trickster Nanaboozhoo (or any 
of numerous spellings) decapitates a number of ducks for his dinner, falls 
asleep while they are cooking, and is angered upon awakening to find 
them gone. l92 It is difficult to draw limits on the interpretation of these 
stories and is probably inferior to the application of primary rules. "In this 
schema, a plurality of meanings for Anishinaabe myths becomes possible, 
but it is not the case that anything goes.,,193 Some limitation in meaning 
must be present or else there will be no meaning at all. 
CONCLUSION 
Tribal courts have an unusual opportunity to mold tribal jurispru-
dence in a manner that speaks to Indian people. Tribal leaders, with 
prodding from both Congress and even the Supreme Court, often have 
187. See Rivers, supra note 1, at 225. 
188. See generally K N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CON-
FLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (5'" ed.1973). 
189. WATSON SMITH & JOHN M. RoBERTS, ZUNI LAW: A FIELD OFVALUES (1954). 
190. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 188, at 40. 
191. See JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA:THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 
46-54 (2002) (applying the Anisrunaabe story, "The Duck Dinner," to a modern environ-
mental dispute). 
192. See id. See also Archie Mosay, When I#nebozho Decapitated the Ducks, in LIVING 
OUR LANGUAGE, supra note 181, at 23,31-33 (retelling the same story with a twist involv-
ing Sioux Indians). 
193. Gross, supra note 180, at 128. 
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instructed tribal judges to find and apply tribal customary and traditional 
law. The desire to find and apply customary law is there, but what is miss-
ing is the method. Tribal judges often are at a loss. 
This Article offers a first look at theorizing intratribal common law 
in terms of the mechanics for tribal judges. I suggest going back to basics 
and relearning H.L.A. Hart's theory of primary and secondary rules, 
rather than applying piecemeal and artificial understandings of tribal cus-
toms. 
Miigwetch. 
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